(DC13) Pseudo-dúvida

Broughton sustenta algo parecido com (1) da minha hipótese interpretativa disjuntiva (cf. (DC1)):

Of course, Descartes sometimes uses the word “doubt” when the more precise term for what he is interested in would be “suspense of judgment.” I think this is because often he wants to draw attention to the radical grounds for doubt that precipitate suspense of judgment in the meditator who is using the method of doubt. It may also be that his choice of words is influenced by the ambiguity in the meaning of “doubt” to which I drew attention earlier. But despite these complications, he is very clear in the Meditations that suspense of judgment is what he is after. [p. 59, nota 27]

Ela acredita que se trata de um trabalho da imaginação que considera dúvidas possíveis. Mas, de qualquer forma, mesmo não sendo atual, essa é uma dúvida possível. Resta saber se é racionalmente possível.