Ordinary Objects: metafisica e confusão lingüística

Eis um pequeno trecho da resenha de Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), de Amie L. Thomasson:

In Ordinary Objects, Amie Thomasson mounts a spirited and vigorous defense of the reality of ordinary objects. She maintains that negative arguments like those just canvassed, despite their diversity in origin and in superficial form, exhibit similar problems arising from questionable background assumptions about matters of meaning, reference, possibility, and necessity. Such assumptions include the view that it makes sense to use words like 'thing' and 'object' in a perfectly general and generic way, and the view that it makes sense to ask (when using the words this way) which kinds of things or objects really exist. Thomasson holds, in opposition to these two assumptions, that fully meaningful uses of such words depend on their being explicitly or implicitly governed, in context, by more specific categories, e.g., "furniture item" or "governmental agency" or "dancing style." This allows her to reply to argument (2), for instance, this way:

"if we interpret generic existence questions as using 'thing' or object' in an entirely 'neutral' sense, we have reason to think that they are incomplete and unanswerable . . . and the failure to find a uniform answer [to the question when several objects compose another object] that yields the objects of common sense would be no reflection on the issue of whether or not those objects exist, but reflect only the fact that the question is ill formed." (p. 136)

(Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2008.05.22. Autor da resenha: Terry Horgan, University of Arisona.)

Se Thomasson está correta, então temos mais um exemplo de um conjunto de problema filosóficos que se origina de uma confusão lingüística ou conceitual. Ainda não li o livro. Mas a julgar pela resenha, parece leitura obrigatória sobre o assunto.

Algumas publicações de Thomasson podem ser encontradas na sua página profissional.