XVI Encontro Nacional da Anpof, vou apresentar novamente, com algumas melhorias aqui e acolá, um texto em que critico o realismo semântico de Barry Stroud, implícito no seu famoso livro sobre o ceticismo, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. A razão dessa repetição é que Stroud estará no evento e não poderia perder a oportunidade de receber um retorno crítico. Eis o resumo do meu texto:
In this paper I initially argue that Stroud's response to Austin's argument against scepticism is based on what I call strong realism about truth, which must be distinguished from weaker versions of realism about truth. The main thesis of the stronger version says that truth is absolutely independent of knowledge, which means that the propositions we believe in could be true of false even if there was no knowledge. Then I argue that this kind of semantic realism is the target of a Wittgensteinian argument against the possibility of massive error, which is a corollary of the strong realism about truth. The main strategy of the Wittgensteinian argument is to show that the massive error hypothesis is incompatible with our only criterion to say that someone has a certain concept. That is to say, the massive error hypothesis leaves no room to explain what it is to have a concept. I also argue that the paradigmatic case argument, criticized by Stroud, is essentially right and Stroud's criticism to it can be answered.